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Supply Chain Contract Evolution 
Abstract 
This paper draws together theories from organisational and neo-institutional literatures to 
address the evolution of supply chain contracts. Using a longitudinal case study of the 
Norwegian State Railways, we examine how firms move through the stages in an inter-
organisational process of supply chain contract evolution and how they can cooperate to 
ensure efficiency and equity in their contractual relationship. The findings suggest that 
inefficient and inequitable initial contracts can occur in part, because of the cognitive 
shortcomings in human decision-making processes that reveal themselves early in the 
arrangement before learning and trust building can accumulate. We then reveal how parties 
can renegotiate towards a more equitable and efficient supply chain contract.   
 
Keywords: contract design, business process modelling, supply chain management   
 
Introduction 
As the phenomenon of outsourcing matures firms are increasingly choosing to outsource key 
components of their value chain. However, deeper and more core outsourcing increases 
dependence on independent producers in a supply network and opens the firm to a variety of 
operational and strategic risks (e.g., Barthelemy, 2003; Earl, 1996; Knight and Harland, 2005; 
Mayer and Argyres, 2004; Verwaal and Hesselmans, 2004). Mitigating these risks impose 
governance costs on companies to ensure the strategic and operational alignment of their 
outsourced activities. Supply chain contracts provide protection by ensuring that promises or 
obligations to perform particular actions are met (Macneil, 1978). 
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 An extensive literature shows how firms can write an efficient contract to protect 
themselves from potential risks in outsourcing engagements (Barthelemy and Quelin, 2006; 
Domberger, 1998; Hart and Moore, 1988; Poppo and Zenger, 2002). However, external and 
internal circumstances frequently change, relationships evolve and contracts can become 
outdated as the benefits and cost sharing between parties move out of balance. Studies of how 
firms proceed from stage-to-stage as contractual relationships evolve dynamically are scarce 
and represent a gap in the literature. This is true particularly in the case of supply chain 
contracting, where most studies fail to acknowledge the dynamic nature of supply chain 
operations and the subsequent need for contracts to evolve over time and as circumstance 
change. What is needed is additional process-based research that shows how firms can adjust 
contracts on an ongoing basis; in particular, how firms evolve from less complete to more 
complete forms of contractual arrangement and from more formal to more informal forms of 
effective governance. 
This study aims to contribute to these issues by examining how firms progress in 
their contractual relationship towards a more equitable and efficient contract. More 
specifically, we focus on the supply chain contract as a dynamic process of cooperative inter-
organisation relationships. The key questions underlying this study are: (1) How do firms 
cooperate to ensure that contracts are efficient and equitable? (2) When is cooperation feasible 
in the contract design process?  (3) How do firms renegotiate contracts to mitigate the risks in 
contract design? We will answer these questions by drawing together theories from 
evolutionary and neo-institutional economics to describe the evolution of inter-organisational 
relationships in a case study of the Norwegian State Railway. The focus of the analysis is on 
how firms can learn to cooperate and ensure that they move to a more efficient and equitable 
contract. We believe that a rich longitudinal case study can provide insight into the evolution 
of cooperation in supply chain outsourcing arrangements. 
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The first section of the paper reviews the literature on supply chain contracts and the 
potential risks associated with such relationships. From this literature we develop a 
provisional model based on a sequence of four stages in inter-organisational governance 
arrangements. The second section discusses our methodology and research design, as well as 
the specifics of the research setting. The section on findings describes the events that took 
place over the six-year study, divided into seven discrete events. In the final section, we 
incorporate the evidence, discuss our interpretation of the events, and offer a more complete 
model based on business process modelling (BPM) as a technique to drive cooperative 
behaviour. 
Theoretical Background 
Supply chain contracts represent the “rules of engagement” for how partners will share the 
benefits and the risks from uncertain supply or demand. These rules are imperfect and 
research has shown that there are many agency problems inhibiting the effectiveness of 
contract design (Jensen and Meckling, 2001). Such problems arise both because of the nature 
of contracting and the nature of human behaviour.  From a contract perspective these 
problems surface because of a natural misalignment of interests between the principal (the 
contracting firm) and agent (the supplier) (Jensen and Meckling, 2001; Ross, 1973), the 
failure of the contract to incentivise the parties correctly and monitor the relationship 
effectively, thereby mitigating moral hazard concerns (Holmstrom, 1979) and natural 
opportunities for opportunism created by bilateral dependent relations (Williamson, 1996).  
From a human decision making perspective, problems occur because managers are boundedly 
rational (Simon, 1976) when accounting for the vast array of contingencies that need to be 
addressed in a contract, and inherently overoptimistic when faced with limited information, 
leading firms to underestimate risks and overestimate benefits (Lovallo and Kahneman, 2003) 
in the early stages of contracting. 
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Scholars recognise that real contracts will be vague, or incomplete, on a number of 
significant dimensions (Grossman and Hart, 1986). In the case of complex systems such as a 
supply chain, it is impossible to provide an exhaustive description of the rights and 
obligations of all contracting parties for every possible contingency. Governing complex 
transactions requires that the contracting parties use a combination of instruments based on 
intermediate degrees of contractual completeness to ensure that the parties can adapt to the 
contingencies that arise in modern business (Williamson, 1985). Research suggests that 
stochastic demand implies that organisations cannot attain efficient outcomes through formal 
contracts alone (e.g., Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Woolthuis et al., 2005), making less structured 
governance instruments necessary if a better level of co-production is to be achieved from the 
relationship. These less formal instruments include trust (Clark, 1993; Gulati, 1995; 
Nooteboom et al., 1997), reputation, hostages (Klein, 2000), and the ‘shadow of the future’ 
(Heide and Miner, 1992). According to this thinking, the business world comprises a network 
of relationships developed and fostered through strategic collaboration (Bidault and Salgado, 
2001; Contractor and Lorange, 1988; Hakansson and Snehota, 1997; Holweg et al., 2005). 
However, trust and cooperation does not arise easily and requires an unusual mix of 
propensity, power and persistence among the partners in a relationship (Carson et al., 2003; 
Johnsen et al., 2008). 
Contractual arrangements based on intermediate degrees of completeness reflect, at 
least in part, the push by scholars towards cooperation, trust and routine as substitutes for 
detailed forms of contractual governance in the supply chain (Johnston et al., 2004). Trust can 
be an efficient complement and substitute for formal contracts because once firms have 
invested in a relationship (Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Woolthuis et al., 2005) mutual 
cooperation becomes a means of reducing costly contract negotiations (Zaheer et al., 1998).  
Routine can also be used to foster a climate of positive reinforcement, independent of trust, 
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that can allow firms to avoid detailed monitoring and coordination costs (Zollo et al., 2002). 
Although cooperation, trust and routine in the supply chain are widely acknowledged as 
important to governance success, it is not clear how this should occur, particularly when what 
is “best” for an exchange partner is usually judged according to its own profit expectations. 
In summary, the sourcing of supply chain functions remains ideally described as an 
arrangement of cooperative inter-firm relationships based on mutual commitment and trust 
between buyers and suppliers (Johnston et al., 2004). In the next section we draw upon the 
inter-organisational alliance and neo-institutional economics literatures to develop a dynamic, 
process-based model of contractual change (see Figure 1). The provisional model describes 
the sequence of stages that captures initial negotiation, ongoing learning processes that inform 
the need for change and an assessment of when contract redesign is feasible.  
<Insert Figure 1 here> 
A Provisional Model  
Contracts as a sequence of commitment, learning and renegotiation 
Ring and Van de Ven (1994) propose a cooperative inter-organisational process framework 
that consists of a sequence of negotiation, commitment and execution stages. Each of these 
stages comprises a number of repeated interactions where the outcome is assessed by 
management in terms of efficiency and equity. Both efficiency and equity are required 
conditions for all organisational arrangements (Ouchi, 1980).  Efficiency is central to most 
standard models of economic exchange and is used by transaction cost researchers to define 
the most, and least, costly governance structure for undertaking a transaction.  Equity is 
defined as “fair dealing” and is considered to be an equally important criterion for assessing 
initial conditions in organisational arrangements (Arino and de la Torre 1998; Ouchi, 1980). 
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The particular contractual provisions that are created and put into play hinge upon the 
efficiency and equity of inter-firm governance (Reuer and Ariño, 2007). However, a reliance 
on decision makers’ expectations in this process can be problematic. In behavioural decision 
theory, studies have shown that people are over-optimistic about their own relative abilities 
and futures (Weinstein, 1980). Lovallo and Sibony (2006) argue that managers tend to 
exaggerate the degree of control they have over events and such over-optimism or over-
confidence distorts the environment in which the managers believe they are operating. In the 
making of strategic contract decisions, over-optimism not only generates unrealistic forecasts 
of the outcomes but also leads managers to underestimate future risks. When decisions 
represent unfamiliar territory, such as is frequently the case for supply chain contracts, the 
risks from over-optimism are even more acute (Powell et al., 2006). 
During the execution of a contractual arrangement the parties engage in a dynamic 
learning process. This stage offers the opportunity for firms in a relationship to learn from 
each other as well as to influence each other’s perceptions about their desirability as a partner. 
The operational learning that takes place during this period is designed to ensure that all 
parties become aware of their need to fulfil efficiency and equity conditions (Arino and de la 
Torre, 1998). This is critical because as Lyles (1988) and Hamel (1991) argue, the initial 
contracts can focus on the wrong set of issues and learning is required to add skills and 
knowledge about firms to manage cooperative relationships (Westney, 1988). 
The contractual relationship between AT&T and Yahoo serves as an example of 
learning over the contract period. During the five-year long contract arrangement both parties 
developed considerable knowledge about their own respective strengths and weaknesses. 
They also engaged in mutual learning and sharing of information, both in operations and 
relationship management. This new learning provided the catalyst for a renegotiated 
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contractual relationship where AT&T sells its broadband DSL service under the joint AT&T 
Yahoo brand name to maximise joint profit. 
As prior contractual commitments are translated into concrete reality, parties may 
experience inordinate degrees of relational risk and performance risk (Das and Bing-Sheng, 
1996), inefficiency and inequity (Ring and Van De Ven, 1994), as well as inter-partner 
conflicts and incongruence. A primary concern extensively discussed in the contract design 
literature has been the threat of opportunism, adverse selection and moral hazard (Akerlof, 
1970; Crocker and Reynolds, 1993; Holmstrom, 1979); where the divergence of goals among 
the parties causes a partner firm to attempt to generate high profits at the expense of the other 
party. To avoid these problems, scholars have suggested that procedures should be developed 
(Arino and de la Torre, 1998) to monitor the exchange relationship against equity and  
efficiency criteria (Johnsen et al., 2008; Ouchi and Maguire, 1975; Ring and Van De Ven, 
1994). In the next section we describe a suitable criterion for the assessment of equity and 
efficiency. 
An assessment of equity and efficiency criteria 
As a relationship evolves, firms may discover that the initial contract terms do not serve their 
needs as expected. Unfortunately, parties do not always try to adjust the contract in a mutually 
agreeable manner. Carson, et al. (1999) develop a criterion based on neo-institutional 
economics that is used to show how inter-organisational cooperation can be achieved between 
self-interested parties. This school of thought recognises that hypothetically ideal contract 
types are often fundamentally flawed because incumbent organisations – with existing 
operations and arrangements – are unable to see a remedially efficient alternative that can be 
described and implemented with positive net gain (Williamson, 1999). Hence, existing 
arrangements matter and at each point in a contract negotiation each of the actual and 
potential contracting parties must be willing to move to the next stage in this process. As an 
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operational matter pertaining to the discussion here, this amounts to asking the following three 
questions about a supply chain contract: 
1. Joint profit requirement: Do existing contractual arrangements allow for joint profits 
(with reallocation if needed)?  
2. Reallocation feasibility requirement: If contract renegotiation is required, is it feasible 
given the characteristics of the exchange arrangement? Is there support among the 
contracting parties to move to a new arrangement? 
3. Switchover feasibility requirement: Is it possible to generate new levels of cooperation 
and trust between exchange partners and create greater cooperation to mitigate 
contract opportunism?  (Including set-up and take down costs). 
Such requirements enable firms to evaluate whether changes or transitions to new contractual 
arrangements are possible to restore efficiency and equity in an exchange relationship. 
Re-evaluation and recommitment under revised conditions  
The performance of a contractual relationship is determined at the outcome stage, where it can 
either be stabilised, reformed, enter a state of progressive decline, or eventually be terminated 
(Das and Teng, 2002). The outcome is likely to be influenced by the mode of interactions that 
transpired during the execution stage (Das and Kumar, 2007). If parties in the relationship 
attempt to reform their contractual arrangement to a closer-to-optimal one that yields 
maximum efficiency and equity to all parties, the relationship progresses to the re-evaluation 
and recommitment stage where firms take onboard the extent to which it is feasible to change 
to a new contractual arrangement. 
During these stages (i.e., execution and re-evaluation), trust plays a critical role in 
supporting dynamic learning processes and the remediable efficiency criterion (Carson et al., 
2003; Holm et al., 1999; Ring and Van De Ven, 1994; Zaheer and Bell, 2005). Work by social 
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scientists indicates that trust is an important condition to create an open and constructive 
atmosphere that enables parties to share more accurate information in a more timely manner 
and to jointly solve problems as they arise (e.g., Larson, 1992; Ring and Van De Ven, 1994). 
Mayer and Argyre’s (2004) study of learning to contract in the personal computer industry 
identified a positive relationship between increased trust and joint learning based on the 
length of the relationship. Woolthuis et al. (2005) found that trust can be both a complement 
and a substitute for contracting. 
In a repetitive sequence of commitment, execution, dynamic learning and routine the 
importance of renegotiation should not be underestimated. Contract renegotiation represents 
considerably more than a simple repetition of the original contract and industry surveys have 
consistently recognised the importance of contract renegotiations. For example, in the case of 
supply chain contracts, the 2004 Supplier Selection and Management Report (SSMR, 2004) 
reveals that over 55% of firms surveyed indicated that they are presently engaged in 
renegotiating existing contracts with their suppliers. Effective execution of a new contract 
requires that sufficient equity and efficiency be in play to ensure that all parties to the new 
arrangement benefit.  
In summary, the provisional model discussed in this section offers a comprehensive 
framework for understanding the dynamic evolution of contractual and quasi-contractual 
relationships and how parties in a relationship evolve together from one stage to the next in 
order to meet their goals. The framework captures the initial expectations that parties have 
about the gains that influence contracting arrangements. Yet, it is important to note that these 
initial expectations should be carefully defined as they are likely to be influenced by errors of 
judgment (Kahneman and Lovallo, 1993). Based on initial expectations, the parties in a 
contractual arrangement execute their contractual commitments. As commitments are 
executed, learning takes place to monitor the extent to which value has been created and 
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distributed among parties. The feasibility of change is then assessed according to remediable 
efficiency criteria. When change is possible, a new sequence of negotiation and commitment 
then occurs that leads to revised contracts. This dynamic process brings in a new equilibrium, 
which in turn, is followed by execution of the new contract. 
Method and Research Design  
Scholars have argued the need for qualitative research that allows us to understand the core 
issues underlying the theory of collaboration. In particular, Smith et al., (1995 p.19) call for 
“more longitudinal case studies that are capable of capturing the complexities and dynamics 
of cooperation.” The analysis in this paper attempts to fill this void based on two theoretical 
considerations: (1) it provides a striking example for illuminating the risk in contract design, 
and (2) the companies had been in operation for a sufficient period of time, enabling us to 
track change over time. The theoretical sampling based on this single case is therefore quite 
straight forward (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007a). The case was chosen because it provides 
an extreme example of a problem in supply chain procurement and provides unusual access to 
rich longitudinal data.   
Research site: Norwegian State Railways 
The Norwegian State Railways (NSB) is one of Norway’s most important transport 
companies, with traditions going back to the opening of the first railway in Norway in 1854. 
NSB is fully owned by the Norwegian state. The main activities of NSB comprise passenger 
traffic on trains and buses, and rail freight traffic. 
Rail Gourmet Togservice Norge AS (RGT) is a joint venture between Rail Gourmet 
and Umoe catering. The company delivers catering services to NSB’s trains in addition to 
several bus companies. Their main service offerings comprise logistics and distribution, 
11 
product development and marketing. Table 1 illustrates the main activities performed by NSB 
and RGT. 
<Insert Table 1 here> 
Research setting: Catering service relationship  
NSB has had a catering service onboard their long and medium distance passenger trains since 
1918. RGT has provided the onboard catering service for NSB since 1918, forging a lasting 
relationship between the two companies. In fact, NSB owned RGT for many years, but in 
1995 decided to outsource catering services in order to save money and focus on the operation 
of train traffic.  
The logistics of catering onboard long distance trains are complex, largely because the 
supplier must be at the railway station platform at the exact time the train arrives in order to 
deliver supplies otherwise, the “customer” – in this case the train – is gone. Another challenge 
is that trains can be rescheduled to take an alternative route, resulting in variations in 
passenger numbers and subsequent last minute changes to onboard supplies. Whenever a train 
is scheduled for a route where it is not back at the base station for several days it will require 
large stocks of food and beverage.  
For medium distance travel, NSB installed vending machines in the trains in the late 
1990s to save on labour costs and improve product availability. The vending machines 
replaced the shopping trolleys that had been used previously. For long distance trains, NSB 
has always used a café wagon where the customers can buy both hot and cold meals. 
Data Collection and Analysis 
The primary source of data collected was based on a co-author’s 2001 – 2007 employment 
experience. During this time she was exposed to a wide variety of positions within the 
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company that ensured sufficient knowledge of the main issues described in this paper. The 
positions within NSB include, but are not limited to work as: a logistics controller and 
member of the contract process redesign team; procurement advisor and assistant contract 
manager. During this six year period the co-author participated in all the business process 
meetings and held discussions with members from both contracting teams. This level of 
participatory observation ensures that a multidimensional perspective on the contractual 
design process is described and enhances the validity of the case study (Gibbert et al., 2008). 
Table 2 lists the 10 managers who were involved in this process indicating their company 
affiliation and prior years of service.   
<Insert Table 2 here> 
To provide different angles on the same phenomenon and to triangulate the validity of our 
findings we obtained various archival data (Yin, 2003). The archival data collected covered 
the entire life of the catering contract from initial development in 1999 to renegotiation in 
2004. The main sources were the interim financial reports 
(http://www.nsb.no/internet/en/About_NSB/index.jhtml?language=en), documents from the 
meetings held during contract negotiations, and the business process mapping exercise that 
the two companies carried out cooperatively. Together, these sources constituted about 350 
pages of detailed summaries and reports that described the challenges, objectives and 
outcomes of the contract process. Additional archival data included a large volume of 
organisational charts, market reports, and internal newsletters etc. Finally, we collected 
relevant press clippings and releases dealing with the contract and firm operations. 
Findings: Events and issues in contract development 
The narrative below describes seven major events that transpired over the six years of 
observation.  The approach is similar to the critical incident technique that provides a set of 
procedures for systematically identifying the behaviours that contribute to success and failure 
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in organisations by isolating each incident to investigate its effects and outcomes (Wikipedia, 
2008).1  Table 3 provides a summary of the seven events and the information source(s) used 
to investigate the effects and outcomes of each event. Although NSB committed to two 
catering contracts over the course of this study – one for the vending machines on the trains 
travelling medium distances, and one for serving food and beverage in the café wagons on 
long distance trains – we have chosen to concentrate on the long distance travel contract only. 
The reason for this is that long distance travel provides a more extreme example of problems 
in supply chain procurement.   
<Insert Table 3 here> 
Event 1: New catering contract for high speed trains  
In 1999, NSB invested heavily in new high speed trains for long distance routes. The intent 
was to use faster trains that were capable of going at much higher speeds to enter a new 
market by competing with airline companies for business customers travelling between the 
major cities of Norway. Every effort was made to ensure that business customers on a NSB 
train would experience a similar level of service to that of an airline; on each trip they would 
be served a three-course meal, tea and coffee and offered free newspapers. Expected revenues 
from this new business segment were high and a new catering contract with a suitable supplier 
was required to provide a new upgraded menu that was considered necessary for business 
class travel.  
Management at NSB expected strong revenue growth from this new market and a 
generous five-year (1999–2004) cost plus contract was developed with this belief in mind. 
RGT received a fixed margin for all product delivered to the trains. All product expenses were 
                                                 
1 We thank the anonymous reviewer for bring this to our attention.   
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paid by NSB with penalties included in the contract to ensure that sufficient product was 
always available.   
Event 2: Execution and commitment through incentives and penalties  
Contract penalties for supply shortages created strong motivation for RGT employees to 
deliver as much product as possible. This situation encouraged the oversupply of stock by 
RGT as NSB carried all the risk for product sales and shrinkage. The RGT employees 
manning the café wagons on each train were responsible for ordering deliveries before they 
went off duty and exercised their own judgement regarding required amounts of stock. This 
subjective approach to ordering resulted in large fluctuations in the quantity of food and 
beverage ordered on each train. Large variations in the type of stock ordered were also 
noticeable, although this was partly explained by differences in demand for particular 
products between the different routes. For example, products consumed on one route, e.g. 
Trondheim–Oslo, would vary for a train scheduled to go Oslo–Stavanger on the next day. The 
reliance on orders made by staff on previous journeys created considerable frustration for 
RGT staff that led to conflict between staff on different routes.  
Other problems inherent in the catering process include: the difficulty of predicting 
ticket sales and therefore the amount of stock needed – particularly in light of the fact that 
many passengers would not make return journeys the same day; and the limited storage 
facilities for keeping food fresh on the trains. The result was a high level of shrinkage on 
some trips and a shortage of food trays on others.  
Event 3:  Disappointment and frustration with contract imbalance 
Old track infrastructure meant that the new trains were not capable of going as fast as 
predicted and the business customers did not choose train travel over plane travel as expected. 
Consequently, the expected growth in revenue did not materialise and the catering contract 
15 
began to cause problems immediately. For example, in 2001 NSB suffered a loss of between 
US$8 – 12 million that was directly attributable to the onboard catering service. In contrast, 
the cost plus contract ensured that RGT earned healthy profits. This created deep resentment 
within NSB as the company felt that the supplier was earning money at their expense.  
Event 4:  Commitment to a roll-on-roll-off concept  
In 2002, new management at RGT provided an opportunity for improved cooperation. NSB 
decided to change the catering service offer to the business traveller and stop serving the three 
dishes of food and instead provide passengers with free newspapers and tea and coffee. This 
change was made in an effort to reduce the number of employees needed on each trip, and 
also to reduce the logistic costs required to service the trains. A decision was also made to 
implement a roll-on-roll-off concept where the goods were put on the trains in Oslo and the 
unsold goods were taken off on the return to Oslo. This reduced shrinkage levels and made 
the provision of food and beverage more accurate. 
The new concept was more expensive in terms of the logistical costs paid to RGT, but 
it drastically reduced shrinkage and secured more accurate stock provisions. Signs of 
improved levels of cooperation and communication between the partners began to appear. 
Regular meetings between the companies were subsequently scheduled to identify areas of 
activity where costs incurred by NSB might be reduced. One of the main initiatives to come 
out of these meetings was the decision to close down the warehouses in the cities of 
Kristiansand and Bergen. This enabled most trains to be serviced from Oslo creating an 
environment that further reduced the costs for NSB.  
Event 5: Competitive bidding process initiated  
Although the restructuring of train catering had led to improvements in financial performance 
for NSB, by 2003 the situation had become untenable. The company continued to incur large 
losses in catering and management began to look forward to 2004 when the original contract 
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was scheduled to expire. In preparation for a new round of contract negotiations, NSB ran a 
BPM exercise to provide management with a visual aid for picturing work processes based on 
inputs, outputs and linked tasks. Business process modelling (or mapping) is a general 
methodology that supports improved design, management and improvement of business 
processes in order to raise the productivity of a company (Smith and Fingar, 2003). The BPM 
activity was designed to provide management with a better understanding of process 
workflow before changes and improvements to the new contract were made. 
 The process of mapping train catering was a time consuming activity. The first step 
was to create an “as-is” analysis of all aspects of train catering. This included, but was not 
limited to, the onboard sales forecasts and planned deliveries, logistics and all the aspects of 
physical deliveries to the trains and sale promotion activities. The BPM provided both 
companies with greater awareness of process complexity and more respect for the challenges 
faced by each other (see Figure 2 for a graphical overview). 
<Insert Figure 2 here> 
After the “as-is” BPM analysis was completed, the process of making a “should be” 
analysis was started. The aim here was to identify the activities that could be performed in a 
better manner. One of the unexpected benefits from the BPM exercise was that it acted as a 
catalyst to develop a healthy relationship between the two companies. The team that worked 
together to map the business processes included people from every department involved with 
catering – both from NSB and RGT – resulting in the building of stronger relationships and 
understanding.  Not only did the shared activity ensure to some degree that NSB and RGT did 
not make a process map that was too narrow, but the newly forged relationships based on 
cooperation and trust would later form the cornerstone for successful contract renegotiation.   
Event 6: New tender process 
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In parallel to the mapping process, NSB worked on preparing for the next catering tender 
round. At the time, RGT was the only vendor capable of delivering train catering and NSB 
spent a lot of time and effort trying to make the deal interesting to other companies. Through 
many meetings with companies, NSB tried to create interest with alternative suppliers to 
participate in the tender process. Cafes, restaurants, kiosks and other potential companies 
attended the meetings, and some showed interest in the contract. NSB issued the request for 
tender in late 2003 to all companies that had shown interest, including RGT. By the closing 
date, NSB had only received one confirmation of intent to tender, from RGT.  
NSB was left with two alternatives: (1) wait until the deadline of the tender and 
negotiate with RGT as if others were bidding for work; or (2) approach RGT in an open and 
honest manner and request that they enter into direct negotiation immediately. Waiting until 
the deadline was risky because it was likely that RGT would discover that they were the only 
supplier. It was anticipated that such a situation might invite ill will between the parties and 
ruin the possibility of an equally profitable contract. NSB decided on the “open and honest” 
option and invited RGT into direct negotiations making it clear that the goal was a long term 
mutually beneficial contract. This approach was later shown to be efficacious as the 
negotiations were characterised by openness and willingness to find the most optimal solution 
for both parties. 
Event 7: The new contract between NSB and RGT 
The negotiation process began with a new “should be” BPM to which RGT proactively 
contributed to this process with several suggestions for improvement. It was clear that both 
parties had realised that mutual dependencies existed; RGT was the only supplier for NSB and 
NSB was by far the largest customer for RGT. The partners made a preliminary agreement 
stating in their objectives that they would share the “total pie” more efficiently and equitably. 
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The new contract was based on a revenue sharing model. This required both parties to 
share equally the burden of future over capacity. NSB paid a fixed amount for logistics and 
administration that was based on RGT’s real costs at the time the contract was signed. It was 
agreed that investments would be kept separate from fixed costs to ensure transparency over 
depreciation periods. If major investments were necessary, RGT and NSB would discuss these 
and decide upon new depreciation time periods. 
All products sold onboard would accrue revenues to both NSB and RGT as both 
companies have a net profit sharing arrangement for those products. The net profit is 
calculated as the sales price minus the product price that RGT pays their suppliers and the net 
profit percentage allocated to each company varies according to the amount of product sold. 
The starting point was based on a net profit distribution that was shared 75:25 between NSB 
and RGT. As sales increase, the percentage awarded to NSB increases. A supplier 
arrangement also ensures that the fixed costs will decrease if the revenue exceeds certain 
predefined levels. 
These factors provided the incentive to push sales to far greater levels. When the 
revenue was approaching the level where the fixed costs decrease, NSB had an incentive to 
increase sales. Once that level was achieved, RGT had an incentive to increase sales to regain 
the amount of fixed costs that had been reduced. These features of the contract provide strong 
motivation for both parties and the results of the new contract have been very promising.  
The new contract was signed in January 2004 and went into full effect from first of 
July 2004. Following the changes in concepts and processes made since 2002 and 
implementation of the new contract catering, profit onboard has improved by more than 40% 
since 2002. This improvement can be attributed to the benefits of BPM in supporting contract 
renegotiations. It is interesting to note that NSB is now one of the few train operators in 
Europe that has been able to make a profit from onboard sales.   
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Interpretation of the Evidence from the Case 
Let us now turn to the data and examine it from a revised model perspective (see Figure 3), 
which begins with the original contract and the associated learning. The first issue is the 
impact of over-optimism. Although one can find cases where over-optimism has positive 
motivational value, it did not prove to be so in this situation (path “A”). In hindsight, one 
could raise many questions regarding the quality of NSB’s decision making in an uncertain 
environment. Even if the new market for high-speed train travel did meet expectations it is not 
clear that the contract would have been distributively fair in terms of equity. As a senior NSB 
manager noted: “evaluating train catering in Norway is difficult, the only operator with any 
experience in the field is NSB and the only supplier with any experience is RGT. A lot of 
guesswork goes on because there is insufficient experience to base our decisions on. In 
hindsight, the uncertainties about demand should have been tackled in a better manner.” 
Returning to our revised model, it is clear that the execution and learning identified an 
imbalance as NSB incurred large losses (π < 0) while RGT achieved healthy profit (π > 0).  
This situation created a need for a re-evaluation against remedial efficiency criterion (path 
“B”).   
<Insert Figure 3 here> 
An assessment of the feasibility of this change indicated two problems. First, there was 
no opportunity for joint profit. Second, since RGT earned healthy profit their motivation for 
large changes in the contract was small. The switching costs involved in moving to an 
alternative contract arrangement – one that RGT anticipated would be less profitable – 
implied that such a change was undesirable for RGT. The most likely reason for this was a 
combination of short sightedness on behalf of RGT and the belief that NSB was locked in 
because alternative suppliers with the necessary skills were not available. At least 
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theoretically, NSB could have created an alternative by establishing their own in-house 
catering service, or signalling their willingness to do so. After all, they had handled train 
catering in the past. However, NSB never made such a move, probably because it realized that 
since it would hardly make sense from a business perspective, signalling their intention to 
revert to in-house services would not be credible. In other words, NSB had no leverage and 
could do little with respect to the activities on the train that would materially hurt RGT more 
than it hurt NSB. Left with no alternative, NSB started to prepare for the contract termination 
date and a new round of contract negotiations with alternative suppliers. 
In the beginning the BPM project was based on a very traditional approach. That is, 
the aim was simply to define the transactional activity (Soliman, 1998) so that a “data road 
map” for future contract discussions could be created (path “C”). As the firms entered into the 
BPM activities, learning took place and relationship-specific knowledge began to develop 
(RQ > 0) from frequent and intense partner interactions, creating a better understanding of 
each other’s procedures, management systems and cultures. The mutual understanding created 
during this time was used to mitigate ex post coordination, conflict resolution, or information-
gathering problems in more formal contractual arrangements (path “D”). 
Important key success factors in the contract renegotiation were: (1) openness and trust 
between the partners; (2) mutual dependency between the partners; (3) a true desire by all 
members of the team to make improvements and find areas of potential savings; and (4) the 
creation of a common goal between the partners; and (5) development of a thorough 
understanding of all the little parts of the process that can be problematic. The application of 
BPM made transparent the switching costs to all partners that provided the catalyst for a new 
level of understanding that ultimately led to new and successful contract renegotiation (path 
“E”). 
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Taken together our case findings are in agreement with previous studies showing that 
trust between parties is vital in order to achieve mutually beneficial solutions (Carson et al., 
2003; Holm et al., 1999; Ring and Van De Ven, 1994; Zaheer and Bell, 2005). Nevertheless, 
the NSB-RGT case also shows that trust is no panacea: RGT, the supplier, did not readily 
offer to forego the profits it was earning early on. The case findings also demonstrate the 
importance of individuals in developing trust; the change of RGT management was seemingly 
crucial for subsequent developments in the relationship between NSB and RGT. Relationships 
are not static; the case of NSB and RGT provides a good illustration of how they change over 
time, both in terms of content and performance. As pointed out by Lunnan and Haugland 
(2008) it is the partners’ abilities to manage the evolution process that matter most in 
achieving long-term benefits.   
Concluding Discussion  
The case of NSB and RGT illustrates that contracting incurs both ex ante and ex post costs 
(Williamson, 1985). Ex ante costs include those of formalizing the contract − reaching 
agreement on rights and responsibilities; meeting legal requirements; gathering information 
and crafting optimal responses to a potentially large set of contingencies – and are costs that 
arise out of parties attempts at dealing with uncertainty. Nevertheless, availability bias based 
on the difficulty in imagining the plethora of ways that events can unfold (Russo and 
Schoemaker, 1992) is a key concern that can lead to over-optimistic assumptions that 
ultimately increase ex post costs. Ex post costs are associated with contract renegotiation 
(Ring, 2002); reorganisation expenses and opportunity costs associated with management 
time (Reuer and Arino, 2002). This includes the costs associated with BPM activities. 
Theoretical implications 
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As we have illustrated in this paper managers make ex ante mistakes that subsequently 
requires parties to engage in economically costly efforts to redistribute profits as new 
contingencies arise. Hence, ex ante and ex post contracting costs are interdependent and must 
be considered interactively according to an upper bound or “fully efficient” state (Ring, 2002; 
Williamson, 1985). The degree of satisfaction with an existing contracting arrangement hinges 
on the extent to which it is perceived to be efficient and equitable. Most of the theoretical 
arguments on the advantages of inter-organisational supply chain relationships implicitly 
assume that parties can agree on the mutual benefits that are central to supply chain 
management (Chen and Paulraj, 2004; Holweg et al., 2005). Yet, little research has been 
undertaken to show how collaboration is achieved in a supply chain setting and gaps exist in 
the literature on outsourcing in the supply chain.  
As mentioned earlier, trust is often seen as a key issue in much of the inter-firm 
relationship literature and our case study adds analytical generalisability to the evidence about 
its benefits.  By analytical generalisability we mean the way empirical observations generalise 
to theory, rather than the population as is typical of statistical generalisability (e.g., Yin 1994; 
Gibbert et al. 2008).  However, trust based mechanisms alone do not always ensure trouble-
free future cooperation in supply chain relationships. The notion of trust-based relations, 
while appealing in its positive vision of inter-firm relationships, can be one-sided and overly 
optimistic. Studies of inter-firm relationships (see, e.g., Jap and Anderson, 2003; Petersen et 
al., 2006) point out that the parties involved also should be aware of “residual” opportunism 
on both sides of the contractual relationship. For example, although some suppliers may 
deliberately underperform, service buyers at times terminate contracts in untimely ways; 
promises and good intentions alone are not always enough. Safeguarding suppliers against 
termination should of course lead to smoother, longer-term and more reciprocal relationships, 
but will not eliminate the possibility that some suppliers also pursue their own, more self-
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interested, agendas. Monitoring and other kinds of anti-shirking measures – as well as the 
development of trust and goal congruence between parties – may help building sustainable 
relationships (Jap and Anderson, 2003).   
Practical implications 
The study provides important insights for practitioners who are contemplating, or who have 
responsibility for, outsourcing procurement and other supply chain activities. Supporting 
human collaboration is challenging partly because of variability in how people work and think 
and we re-emphasise that cognitive shortcomings are unlikely to disappear and to some extent 
are unavoidable.  Hence, contract managers should take certain precautions to minimise the 
risk.  We suggest two distinct approaches that can help companies mitigate the risks in the 
supply chain contract design context.  First, we provide a remedial framework to counter 
biases and guide decision making.  Second, we show that companies can create the trust and 
cooperation required to support contract renegotiation by embedding BPM into the contract 
development process.  
Another important contribution this paper makes to managerial practice is 
demonstrating how BPM can force inter- and intra-organisational teams to think through the 
entire value chain. Unfortunately, most of the research conducted in BPM has been focussed 
on software management or efforts to define double work and non-value-adding activities 
(Soliman, 1998). This is a shame as BPM offers much more and is essentially a new way of 
managing the firm that is based on a more holistic approach. Business process modelling can 
be used to capture complementary benefits such as resources, managerial motivations, social 
exchanges and various inter- and intra-organisational dependencies. Through our longitudinal 
case study, we confirm the enterprise level value of BPM as an important enabler of trust, 
collaboration and routine. The use of BPM acts as a safeguard for the firm and its suppliers to 
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ensure existing processes are well understood and also serve as a baseline for future decision 
making. 
Limitations and future research opportunities 
This longitudinal research has two limitations. First, the study is limited to two organisations 
within the transportation sector. Therefore, attempts to extend the conclusions regarding the 
value of BPM to other research contexts may not necessarily hold. Nevertheless, industrial 
sectors with comparable structural characteristics and environmental circumstances may draw 
inferences from this work. Second, the findings in this paper are at best exploratory. This does 
not reduce the legitimacy or value of the research design in contributing to this research. The 
longitudinal research design provides in-depth insight into a significant “real-world” problem 
from which there is little academic theory. Furthermore, the longitudinal data collection 
approach enables us to mitigate retrospective sense-making and impression management 
(Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007b).  
 Opportunities exist for future research to further investigate the role that BPM plays in 
supporting collaboration, trust and routine. The existing research is largely based on a coarse 
or global approach to contractual arrangements that could mask some of the more complex 
effects in a contractual arrangement (Reuer and Ariño, 2007). Further research based on how 
firms move from one contractual arrangement to another could prove helpful in better 
understanding the heterogeneity that exists within and across discrete governance structures in 
the supply chain. 
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